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NOTES AND COMMENTS
AGENCY
MASTER AND SERVANT-MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR INTEN-
TIONAL TORT OF SERVANT GROWING OUT OF PAST
INTERFERENCE WITH SERVANT'S WORK
While the plaintiff's car and the defendant's bus were stopped at an
intersection, the driver of the bus got out, went back to the plaintiff's
car, and after an argument with plaintiff, assaulted him. Previously the
bus driver had had difficulty in passing the plaintiff on the highway
because the plaintiff was driving in the center of the road. In an action
brought against the employer of the bus driver, the court held that the
employer was not liable as the servant was not acting within the scope
of his employment. One judge dissented.1
If there had been no previous interference with, or annoyance to
the authorized performance of the servant, here the driving of the bus,
the employer would not be liable for the intentional tort of his servant,2
unless the use of force was authorized, or implied from the authorized
act, such as in protection of property.3 Nor, under the majority opinion,
wvill the presence of interference or annoyance with the authorized per-
formance be enough to bring the torious act, otherwise outside the scope
of employment, within such scope.4 This is especially true when the
force used is extreme, and accompanied by display of anger and desire
for revenge on the part of the servant.5  It is the state of mind of the
'Plotkin v. Northland Transportation Co., zo 4. Minn. 422, 283 NV.W 758 (1939).
2Little Miami Ry. Co. v. whetmore, 59 Ohio St. zio, z Am. Rep. 373 (i869)i
Z lIECHEa,, AorNcr (ad ed.) secs. 1977, 1978 and cases cited.
3 Blakely v. Greer, z8 Ohio C.C. 33, affirmed without opinion, 8r N.E. 1197 (1907)
Bearman v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 17 La. App. S, 134 So. 787 (193); Montal-
bana v. Rainbow Garden, 9 Cal. App. (zd) 66i, 5o P. (ad) 972 (1935)i Philipovich v.
Pittsburgh Coal Co., 314 Pa. 585, 17z Atl. 136 (1934); Metzler v. Layton, z98 Ill. App.
5z9, xg N.E. (ad) 130 (x939).
'Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Huntington, zig Ohio St. 555 (1929)i Pratley v. Sherwzn-
Williams Co., 56 S.WV. (2d) 5 o, (Texas Civ. App. 1933); State ex rel. Gosselin v. Trim-
ble, 328 Mo. 76o, 41 S.iv. (2d) 8o (93) ; Trebitsch v. Goelet Leasing Co., Z52 N.Y.
554, 170 N.E. 14o (i9z9); Druce v. Sparrow-Kroll Lumber Co., 133 N.W. 938, 47
L.R.A. (N.S.) 959 (igis); Cleveland v. Newson, 45 Mich. 6z (aSS'); see cases cited in
2 Mscnmn, AGENcY, (ad ed.) sec. 1977, 1978i (1939) 23 MINN. L. REv. 981; (939)
19 O E. L. RnV. 184.
'Plumer v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., SS Ga. App. 622, 599 S.E. 353 (938);
Pratley v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 56 S.v. (zd) gso (Texas Civ. App. 1933); Common-
wealth Casualty Co. v. Header, xiS Ohio St. 4z9, 16 N.E. 278 (192S).
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servant that is material,6 and the master is relieved from liability if the
servant had no intent to act on the master's behalf, even though the
events from which the tortious acts follow arise while the servant is acting
in the employment, and although the servant became angry because of
them.7
However some courts have held the master liable if the quarrel, per-
sonal or otherwise, was inspired by something connected with the ser-
vanes work.' Under these decisions, the master has been held liable
in cases where installment collectors assaulted the plaintiff while at-
tempting to repossess the article sold,' and also in cases involving the use
of force to coerce payment of bills, even when such force was expressly
forbidden."0 A New York court held that the servant was acting with-
in the scope of his employment when, after passing the vehicle of a
competitor, he intentionally backed into such vehicle, a case factually
similar to the one under discussion." In Interstate Co. v. McDaniel,
the Mississippi court stated the rule that where the act complained
of is not so separated by time and logical sequence from the act
or conflict within the scope of the agency, the master is not relieved
from liability if all the features constitute one continuous and unbroken
occurrence." In that case the servant thought the plaintiff had taken
and eaten oranges the servant was to sell, and therefore assaulted the
plaintiff. It is similar to the principal case in that it involved past inter-
ference, but as it also involved protection of property from future inter-
ference it is not definitely in point. But in Chicago Mil and Lumber
Co. v. Bryeans, " where a quarrel growing out of decedent's interfer-
ence with workers under the servant's supervision had been stopped, the
court held the master was nevertheless liable for the death resulting
from a resumption of the quarrel. Responsibility is not determined by
the motive which makes an employee do what he does, and is not limited
to those acts which promote the object of the employment. 4 The in-
tentional tort must, however, be closely connected in regard to time and
place with an act or conflict within the authorized performance; other-
a A.L.I. RESTAT]EMENT OF AGENCY, Sec. 235.
7A.L.I. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, SeC. 245.
' (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 342.
'Anderson v. Tadlock, 27 Ala. App. 53, 175 So. 41Z (x937); Rouda v. The Lowery
and Goebel Co., 9 Ohio App. 91 (1917)5 Russell-Locke Service v. Vauphn, 179 Ol. 377,
40 Pac. (2d) 1o9o (193S).
'Son v. Hartford Ice Cream Co., ioz Conn. 696, 329 At. 778 (3925).
'Curley v. Electric Vehicle Co., 68 App. Div. 1S, 74 N.Y.S. 35 (3902)5 see also
Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co., . H. & C. 526 (i86z).
"Interstate Co. v. McDaniel, 178 Miss. 276, 173 So. 16s (1937); contra, John v.
Lococo, 256 Ky. 607, 76 S.W. (2d) 897 (3934).
'
3 Chicago Mill and Lumber Co. v. Bryeans, 137 Ark. 34, 209 S.W. 69 (3939);
semble, Gulf C.S.F. Ry. v. Cobb, 45 S.W. (7d) 323 (Texas Civ. App. 1933).3
.Netzler v. Layton, 298 Ill. App. 529, ig N.E. (2d) 130 (939)-
wise even under this rule, the master will not be liable.1 5 So in Norm-
ington v. Neely" the court held that it was necessary to find that the
assault was a continuation of an occurrence which was within the scope
of employment, and that after a taxi driver had checked in for the night,
and then attended the theatre, the employer was not liable for an assault
committed upon meeting a competing taxi driver, although the assault
arose out of a quarrel which took place during working hours several
hours previously. And in Raben v. Hamilton Diamond Co." the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals sent a case back for retrial to determine whether
the agent had completed his work before or after the assault took place.
The facts in the principal case do not reveal the time intervening between
the conflict for precedence on the road and the assault upon the plaintiff,
and the absence of mention of the time factor indicates that it was viewed
by the court as immaterial, as long as the conflict preceded the assault.
If the intervening time was a matter of minutes rather than hours, the
court has apparently aligned itself with the majority rule.
F.F.V
CONFLICT OF LAWS
CONFLICTS - SALES -E FFECT OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
LAW ON OUT OF STATE CONDITIONAL SALE
One 'Velikson, on August 26, 1936, purchased an automobile from
the Goodman Co. in New York upon a conditional sales contract which
was duly recorded there. Later, the Union Commercial Corp. purchased
the Goodman Co.'s interest in the note. Welikson, in 1937, without the
consent or knowledge of the holder of the conditional sales contract
brought the car to Ohio where he had obtained employment. In Rich-
land County, Ohio, he filed a sworn statement of ownership with the
Clerk of Courts without mentioning the conditional sales contract.
Welikson then obtained an Ohio license. In January, 1938, he pur-
chased a new car and traded in the old one to the R. J. Schmunck Co.,
filing with the Clerk of Courts of Cuyahoga County an application and
certificate of title for the old car without disclosing the lien. A certif-
icate of title was issued him showing it free of all encumbrances and he,
in turn, assigned it to the R. J. Schmunck Co., which then had a new
certificate issued to it. On February 2, 1938, the Union Commercial
Corp. heard of the transaction and brought a replevin action, which
was decided in favor of the defendant in the Cleveland Municipal Court.
a'Richberger v. American Express Co., 73 Miss. x61, iS So. 9zz (xS96).
"Normington v. Neely, 58 Idaho 134, 70 P. (2d) 369 (1937).
'RPaben v. Hamilton Diamond Co., i9 Cal. App. (zd) zz, 6S P.(zd) 98 (1937).
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